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MISUSE AND ABUSE OF LEGAL ARGUMENT BY
ANALOGY IN TRANSJUDICIAL
COMMUNICATION: THE CASE OF
ZAHEERUDDIN V. STATE
Amjad Mahmood Khan1
ABSTRACT
This article explores the risks and limits of transjudicial communication. In particular, I critique the scholarly contention that
transjudicial communication can be built upon commonly accepted
methods of legal reasoning. I argue that transnational courts do not
uniformly understand or apply commonly accepted methods of legal
reasoning, especially legal argument by analogy. As a result, transnational courts that utilize transjudicial communication can and do
render specious, even destructive, judicial opinions. I analyze the case
of Zaheeruddin v. State—a controversial decision by the Supreme
Court of Pakistan that upheld the constitutionality of Pakistan’s antiblasphemy ordinances. The Supreme Court of Pakistan poorly analogized to numerous U.S. Supreme Court authorities to bolster and legitimize its deeply flawed decision.
INTRODUCTION
In his 2009 majority opinion in Graham v. Florida, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy cited to foreign law as persuasive authority to hold that life-without-parole sentences for juveniles
convicted of non-homicide crimes were unconstitutional.2 In his 2003
majority opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, Justice Kennedy cited a decision by the European Court of Human Rights as persuasive authority
to hold that a Texas statute criminalizing acts of sodomy was unconstitutional.3 The recent and rising trend of U.S. courts to rely on foreign
1

The author is a senior litigation associate at Latham & Watkins LLP and a postgraduate research fellow at Harvard Law School. He is a graduate of Claremont
McKenna College (B.A., 2001) and Harvard Law School (J.D., 2004), a former judicial clerk to the late Honorable Warren J. Ferguson, Senior Circuit for the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and a former Editor-in-Chief of the
Harvard Human Rights Law Journal. He has testified twice before the Tom
Lantos Human Rights Commission at the United States House of Representatives
about the persecution of religious minorities in the Islamic world. He can be
reached at amjad@post.harvard.edu.
2
See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2033 (2010).
3
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003).
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law for constitutional adjudication, particularly for contentious issues,
illustrates more generally the globalization of modern constitutionalism. Indeed, as legal problems become more common across more common law systems in the world, courts increasingly rely on the legal
opinions of outside jurisdictions as a powerful source of persuasive
authority.
Professor Anne-Marie Slaughter describes such cross-court citation and deliberation on common legal problems as “transjudicial
communication.”4 Her typology suggests the relative merits of this
communication and even describes its increasing trend as an emergence of a new and promising “global community of courts.”5 Transjudicial communication, argues Slaughter, fosters cross-fertilization of
legal ideas and becomes a “pillar of a compelling vision of global legal
relations” where “national differences would be recognized, but would
not obscure common legal problems nor block the adoption of foreign
solutions.”6 For Slaughter, what helps develop this cross-fertilization
of legal ideas is a common judicial identity and legal methodology, including among other tools, common methods of legal reasoning across
legal systems.7
This article explores some of the risks and limits of transjudicial communication. I call into question Slaughter’s contention
that common methods of legal reasoning necessarily advance cross-fertilization of ideas between courts of competing systems. I argue that
transnational courts do not uniformly understand methods of legal
reasoning. To this end, I focus my critique on one particular method of
legal reasoning that Slaughter would deem to be “common” to transjudicial communication: legal argument by analogy. Proper legal argument by analogy is a less common, or a less consistently applied,
judicial methodological tool to work with. To encourage transjudicial
communication through legal argument by analogy is problematic not
only because the mode of analogy itself is more rigorous than it appears, but also because legal argument by analogy carries special risks
in the transjudicial setting.
Part I details Slaughter’s typology of transjudicial communication. Part II introduces the basic principles and methodology underlying legal argument by analogy. Here, I contrast the views of two
prominent scholars of jurisprudence—Professor Cass Sunstein and
4
Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH.
L. REV. 99, 101 (1994).
5
Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 191,
192-93 (2003); see also Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429, 430-32 (2003).
6
Slaughter, supra note 4, at 132.
7
Id. at 125.
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Professor Scott Brewer—concerning the rational force of legal argument by analogy. I also outline the basic problems associated with legal argument by analogy and highlight what Sunstein refers to as the
“distinctive illogic of bad analogical reasoning.”8 Finally, Part III illustrates the troubling consequences of poor analogical reasoning in the
transjudicial context by way of an analysis of Zaheeruddin v. State9—a
controversial and extant 1993 decision by the Supreme Court of Pakistan that relies principally on U.S. constitutional and trademark law
as persuasive authority.
PART I: SLAUGHTER’S TYPOLOGY OF TRANSJUDICIAL
COMMUNICATION
A. Horizontal and Vertical Communications
Slaughter’s typology of transjudicial communication succinctly
summarizes the characteristics and relative merits of certain courts
citing and deferring to courts outside their national jurisdiction. She
outlines two major types of transjudicial communication: horizontal
and vertical. She defines horizontal communication as communication
between courts of the same authority and stature across national and
regional borders (e.g., the U.S. Supreme Court referencing decisions of
the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, or vice versa).10 Horizontal communication consists of a court’s tacit emulation of a court of another jurisdiction by way of cross-citation of decisions.11 Horizontal
communication usually operates as a “monologue” where neither the
originating nor the sharing court has any direct and formal links, nor
do they directly converse with one another.12 The originating court is
wholly unaware that its views have a foreign audience; the listening
court manufactures the foreign audience.
Slaughter defines vertical communication as communication
between courts of different statures across national and regional borders (e.g., the U.S. Supreme Court referencing decisions by the Inter8

CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 74 (1996).
Zaheeruddin v. State, (1993) 26 SCMR (SC) 1718, 1753–54 (Pak.). The Supreme
Court of Pakistan voted four to one in favor of declaring Ordinance XX, two of
Pakistan’s anti-blasphemy laws, to be constitutional. Justice Abdul Qadeer
Chaudhry wrote the majority opinion. Justices Muhammad Afzal Lone, Saleem
Akhtar and Wali Muhammad Khan joined the majority. Justice Saleem Akhtar
wrote a concurring opinion. Justice Shafiur Rahman, the Court’s Senior Justice,
dissented from the majority opinion.
10
Slaughter, supra note 4, at 103.
11
Id. at 104.
12
Id. at 113.
9
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American Court, or vice versa).13 Like horizontal communication, vertical communication consists of cross-citation between courts, but usually involves more formal deference on the part of a court of narrow
jurisdiction towards a court of wider jurisdiction. Vertical communication can operate as a “dialogue” where both the originating and sharing courts recognize and acknowledge each other’s cross-citations.14
B. Functionality and Purpose
Slaughter highlights two generally desirable functions of
transjudicial communication: cross-fertilization of legal ideas and increased legitimacy of individual judicial decisions. With respect to the
first function—cross-fertilization of legal ideas—Slaughter points out
how an originating court’s particular decision can often be “cast [into]
transnational winds” in no predetermined direction.15 A listening
court adopts the originating court’s decision either expressly as a
means to bolster its own like-minded decision (i.e., actual citation of
the originating court’s decision) or implicitly by adopting a parallel
line of reasoning (i.e., incorporation without express citation).16 Functionally speaking, transjudicial communication allows a listening
court to resolve particularly difficult legal issues through express or
implied affirmation of legal arguments made by courts of foreign jurisdictions. In this way, transnational legal arguments cross-fertilize.
With respect to the second function—increased legitimacy of
individual judicial decisions—Slaughter points out how transjudicial
communication, whether horizontal or vertical, with express or implied citation, legitimizes a listening court’s decision.17 A listening
court may intend to arrive at a correct statement of the law (assuming
such a statement exists) or to persuade the court’s audience of lawyers,
litigants and citizens (assuming a general indeterminacy in the law).18
Regardless, transjudicial communication confers authority upon what
others might perceive as an irrational and illegitimate decision.
C. Communicating Through What is Common
What sets up and perpetuates transjudicial communication?
By virtue of their common institutional mission to apply and interpret
the law, common law courts are uniquely positioned to engage in
transjudicial communication. What makes such communication more
13

Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 1103, 1104
(2000).
14
Id.
15
Slaughter, supra note 4, at 118.
16
Id. at 119.
17
Id.
18
Id.
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or less frequent or elaborate depends on how transnational courts
build upon common methods of legal reasoning.19 Specifically, Slaughter refers to the use and invocation of clear legal rules and case precedence.20 The common enterprise of “balancing rights and duties,
individual and community interests, and the protection of individual
expectations,” argues Slaughter, “transcends any cultural or ideological differences between different common law systems.”21 Once the
common enterprise begins, a global community of courts might develop
whereby courts further acknowledge a common set of principles that
define their own mutual relations.22 The prerequisite to such a development, however, is the pursuit of transjudicial communication
through common methods of legal reasoning.
PART II: ONE (NOT SO) COMMON METHOD OF LEGAL
REASONING: LEGAL ARGUMENT BY ANALOGY
A. Assessing What is Common
Slaughter’s typology assumes that transnational courts might
benefit from cross-citation and cross-fertilization of legal ideas because
they share common ways to arrive at judicial decisions. Thus, if Court
B of Country B cites prior precedence from its own jurisdiction, formulates and applies legal rules, and articulates coherently its reasoning
and conclusion, it would be permissible, indeed even desirable, for it to
cite to case law of Court A of Country A as persuasive authority, assuming that Court A shares the same methods of legal reasoning. But
even if Courts A and B share the same judicial methodology, they may
not consistently utilize the methodology in the same manner.23 Indeed, transjudicial communication cannot readily be built upon inconsistently applied methods of legal reasoning.
To help illustrate this point, consider one method of legal reasoning courts frequently use in their decisions: legal argument by
analogy.24 The use of legal argument by analogy by courts of different
jurisdictions or countries may ostensibly appear to be common. Upon
further scrutiny, however, legal argument by analogy is not commonly
19

Id. at 125.
Id. at 126.
21
Id. at 127.
22
Slaughter, supra note 5, at 194. See also ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW
WORLD ORDER 69 (Princeton Univ. Press 2004).
23
Note here that my point applies no less to courts within the same country and
jurisdiction (e.g., Courts A1 and A2).
24
What Slaughter describes rather vaguely as “the ability to formulate a rule of
general applicability and to generate coherent distinctions between the outcome in
the case at hand and divergent outcomes in apparently similar cases.” Slaughter,
supra note 4, at 126.
20
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utilized in the same manner and is in fact poorly understood and
applied.
B. Legal Argument by Analogy: Purpose and Methodology
Judges render legal arguments by analogy when they make
claims or derive conclusions about uncertain factual issues by comparing the relevant similarities and differences between those issues and
the issues of another distinct case or concept.25 More generally, legal
argument by analogy is “the use of examples in the process of moving
from premises to conclusions in an argument.”26 In common law systems, the “examples” used by judges are legal precedents or prior
cases; more precisely, common law judges reason from precedential
analogies, particularly in constitutional cases.27 In order to resolve
their doubts and disputes about factual issues, judges run through examples to discern who or what might be similarly or dissimilarly
situated.28
Professor Sunstein summarizes the structure of legal argument by analogy in four steps:
(1) Some fact pattern A has a certain characteristic X, or
characteristics X, Y, and Z; (2) Fact pattern B differs
from A in some respects but shares characteristics X, or
characteristics X, Y, and Z; (3) The law treats A in a certain way; (4) Because B shares certain characteristics
with A, the law should treat B the same way.29
Two cases may be different from each other in innumerable ways;
what renders them analogous is when there are no relevant differences
between them—that is, any differences between the two cases do not
themselves make a difference with respect to the actual precedents attached to them.30 Precedents are narrow conclusions of law that
judges make based on their choice of distinctive facts in a fact pattern.
For example, Jehovah’s Witnesses and Muslims have significant differences in their beliefs and practices, but for purposes of protecting
the free exercise of their religion in the United States, both groups
may be analogously situated. If in one case a court upholds a regulation that permits a Jehovah’s Witness to distribute literature in a
25

See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 87 (1988).
Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational
Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 925, 934 (1996).
27
Id.
28
Id. at 937.
29
SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 65.
30
Id. at 67.
26
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town entirely owned by a private company,31 in a subsequent case a
court should uphold a regulation that permits a Muslim to do the
same, notwithstanding the numerous differences in the beliefs and
practices of Jehovah’s Witnesses and Muslims. The judge in the second case—the case of the Muslim—would deem such differences irrelevant in arriving at her decision. In this manner, the first and second
cases would be analogous.
If legal argument by analogy requires two cases to be relevantly similar with no relevant differences between them, and a judge
must decide when differences prove relevant based on her own convictions, then the method itself can be characterized as subjective. Sunstein identifies this subjectivity as an inherent limitation to legal
argument by analogy. He argues that legal argument by analogy “operates without anything like a deep or comprehensive theory that
would account for the particular outcomes it yields. . .the judgments
that underlie convictions about the relevant case are incompletely theorized.”32 By incompletely theorized agreements, Sunstein means that
judges suggest general principles that capture their convictions and
render cases analogous, but they do not test those principles against
specific examples outside the universe of the facts of the case at
hand.33 A judge’s generally articulated principle may fail when held
up against such examples, but so long as the general principle explains
the case and analogy at hand, a judge can—and indeed should—invoke it. For Sunstein, the principal virtue of legal argument by analogy is that judges who disagree at the level of comprehensive theory
may nevertheless be able to agree on low-level analogies among
cases.34 Society benefits when judges reach practical agreement
against a background of moral controversy through legal argument by
analogy.35
If Sunstein’s depiction of the inherent limitations of legal argument by analogy is accurate—that legal arguments by analogy are
based on incompletely theorized agreements that have low formal effi31

See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (holding that the managers of a
company-owned town could not curtain the religious liberty of a Jehovah’s Witness
distributing religious literature).
32
SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 68.
33
Id. at 36. See also Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary: Incompletely Theorized
Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1735-36 (1995).
34
Emily Sherwin, A Defense of Analogical Reasoning in Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV.
1179, 1181 (1999) (arguing that “the practice of reasoning by analogy from prior
decisions has advantages, both epistemic and institutional, that exceed its rational
force.”).
35
Id. See also SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 36. Sunstein argues that incompletely
theorized agreements allow for greater collaboration in the face of disagreements
and are practically significant in terms of generating relevant laws.
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cacy but that are nonetheless socially useful—then legal argument by
analogy can well be used as a common method of legal reasoning for
transjudicial communication. So long as courts adhere to the generally understood structure of legal argument by analogy of the kind
Sunstein sets forth, common law judges should be free to analogize to
foreign cases in their domestic jurisprudence regardless of the depth of
the general principles they articulate. Thus, it is essential to determine whether legal argument by analogy has more rational force than
what Sunstein concedes.
C. Intellectual Honesty in Legal Argument by Analogy
Sunstein is not wholly skeptical about the rational force of legal argument by analogy. He identifies what he deems to be inherent
limitations to the method while also recognizing the method to be the
best that judges and lawyers have to work with. Professor Brewer
identifies scholars such as Sunstein who stake faith in legal argument
by analogy by foregoing the need to rationally articulate and justify
judges’ use of relevancy in their analogical arguments as “mystics.”36
In the name of practicality and utility, mystics blindly accept what
they deem to be an inherent subjectivity in legal argument by analogy.
Brewer points out that a mystical belief in legal argument by
analogy neglects to consider the actual rational force behind the
method. Specifically, he argues that the general principles through
which judges analogize cases are not necessarily based on incompletely theorized agreements, as Sunstein would contend, but rather
on a clearly defined scheme of argument that is formally cognizable
and that can be evaluated and critiqued. Brewer reconstructs the conventional structure of legal argument by analogy with three distinct
components.
The first component is what he characterizes as “abduction in
the context of doubt.”37 A judge who is equipped with a set of legal
propositions based on fact patterns from prior cases, but who has
before her a new competing fact pattern that might potentially cast
doubt on the scope of those propositions, might seek to make consistent her set of propositions with the new competing fact pattern by
discovering a rule that encapsulates both the prior and present fact
patterns. If given this rule (R), then the set of propositions (P) could
logically apply to the new competing fact pattern (F). The judge,
thereby, first discovers and then tentatively accepts R to be an inference to the best legal explanation of how to apply P to F (i.e., the judge
abduces R).38 Having derived R, the judge next applies R to examples
36
37
38

Brewer, supra note 26, at 951.
Id. at 962.
Id.
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outside the context of the case at hand to test its validity. In so doing,
the judge implicitly provides some justification (J) for why she chose R
(the judge’s justification could reflect her convictions, the standards of
her community, etc.). Brewer identifies this process of confirming or
disconfirming R as the second component of legal argument by analogy. Finally, once the judge confirms the validity of R (to the extent
she can), she applies R to trigger the application of P to F and thus
completes her analogy. Brewer refers to R as the “analogy-warranting
rule” and to J as the “analogy-warranting rationale.”39
Put differently, if a judge analogizes two items, be they cases or
judgments, then she should show how the relevant shared similarities
between the items logically relate to some other inferred similarity between the items. When she articulates this relation, she is said to be
using an analogy-warranting rule. A judge does not arbitrarily make
an analogy; some reason motivates her analogical choice. The reason
is the analogy-warranting rationale. Brewer introduces the following
formal scheme to explain his logical form of legal argument by
analogy:
Where x, y, z are individuals and F, G, H are predicates
of individuals:
Step 1: z has characteristics F, G, . . .
Step 2: x, y, . . . have characteristics F, G, . . .
Step 3: x, y, . . . also have characteristic H.
Step 4: The presence in an individual of characteristics
F, G. . .provides sufficient warrant for inferring
that H is also present in that individual.
Step 5: Therefore, there is sufficient warrant to conclude that H is present in z.40
The analogy-warranting rules and rationales that undergird legal argument by analogy for Brewer undercut Sunstein’s formulation
of incompletely theorized agreements. Brewer formalizes the nexus
between a judge’s unexpressed convictions and her analogical choice.
By virtue of analogy warranting rules and rationales, a judge can formally construct the general principles that drive her particular analogical choice. In so doing, a judge’s analogical choice may be critically
evaluated. Sunstein’s formulation of incompletely theorized agreements takes for granted a judge’s convictions and provides no basis or
mechanism to assess the validity of her analogical choice. With
Brewer’s formulation, beyond the utility of its craft and convenience,
legal argument by analogy may actually be subject to rational
scrutiny.
39
40

Id. at 965.
Id. at 966.
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Intellectual honesty cautions a judge from venturing down a
path of analogical decision-making that might not be able to withstand
rational scrutiny. Such honesty tempers the use of an otherwise convenient tool of legal reasoning and makes it more difficult for judges to
employ valid analogical arguments in judicial opinions. While judges
in common law systems might consistently apply legal argument by
analogy—that is, while the invocation of the method might be common, as Slaughter suggests, and the structure of analogical argument
itself “invariant,”41 as Brewer suggests—the successful application of
legal argument by analogy is not very common.
D. Poor Analogical Reasoning
Notwithstanding their contrasting formulations of the rational
force behind legal argument by analogy, both Sunstein and Brewer
would agree with the basic characteristics that underlie poor analogical reasoning. Two main problems often emerge when judges employ
legal argument by analogy. First, judges often simply announce that a
particular case or fact pattern is analogous to the case or fact pattern
at hand without concretely describing the relationship between the
two cases or fact patterns.42 That is, they invoke the nominal force of
legal argument by analogy without parsing through the precise relationships between the source and target cases or fact patterns. Any
argument for the analogical relationship is left unexpressed. Sunstein
refers to this as a problem of “bad formalism.”43 Second, judges do not
adequately defend judgments about relevant similarities and differences.44 More frequently, judges gloss over the relevant differences
between the source and target cases or fact patterns and overplay
their similarities.
PART III: LEGAL ARGUMENT BY ANALOGY AND
ZAHEERUDDIN V. STATE
So far, I have defined Slaughter’s typology for transjudicial
communication and have questioned her assumption that common
methods of legal reasoning may encourage cross-fertilization of legal
ideas. I have shown that legal argument by analogy is ill-perceived as
a loose, convenient tool for judges. Rather, legal argument by analogy
is formally structured, rigorous, and, in its most robust form, subject to
rational scrutiny. While commonly invoked by common law courts, legal argument by analogy is less commonly applied to intellectually
honest ends. Transjudicial communication, therefore, should not be
41
42
43
44

Id. at 965.
SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 77.
Id. at 73.
Id.
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encouraged on the basis of a method of legal reasoning that is uncommonly understood and applied.
To help support these contentions, I analyze a seminal constitutional decision by the Supreme Court of Pakistan: Zaheeruddin v.
State. The controversial 1993 majority opinion illustrates the significant risks and consequences of employing legal argument by analogy
in the transjudicial context.
A.

Zaheeruddin v. State: Background

On July 3, 1993, the Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed
eight appeals brought by members of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community45 who were arrested under Ordinance XX and Pakistan Penal
45

The Ahmadiyya Muslim Community is a contemporary messianic movement
founded in 1889 by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1839–1908), who was born in the small
village of Qadian in Punjab, India. See THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA (2003),
available at http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1E1-Ahmadiyy.html (last visited
June 30, 2011). In 1889, Ahmad announced that he had received divine revelation
authorizing him to accept the baya or allegiance of the faithful. See Ahmadiyya
Muslim Community, The Ahmadiyya Movement in Islam: An Overview, available
at http://alislam.org/introduction (last visited June 30, 2011). In 1891, he claimed
to be the expected mahdi or reformer of the latter days, the Awaited One of the
world community of religions, and the messiah foretold by the Prophet Muhammad in the seventh century. See THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA (2003). Ahmad’s
teachings, incorporating Indian, Sufi, Islamic, and Western elements, attempted
to revitalize Islam in the face of the British raj, Protestant Christianity, and resurgent Hinduism. See id. Thus, Ahmad introduced the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community as a revivalist movement within Islam and not as a new religion.
Members of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community (“Ahmadis”) profess to be
Muslims. They contend that Ahmad meant to revive the true spirit and message
of Islam that the Prophet Muhammad introduced and preached; he meant to relieve Islam from all misconstrued or superstitious teachings that had tainted it for
fourteen centuries. See M. Nadeem Ahmad Siddiq, Enforced Apostasy: Zaheeruddin v. State and the Official Persecution of the Ahmadiyya Community in Pakistan,
14 LAW & INEQ. 275, 279 (1995). Orthodox Muslims, particularly Sunnis, believe
that Ahmad had proclaimed himself as a prophet, thereby rejecting a fundamental
tenet of Islam: Khatme Nabuwwat (literally to orthodox Muslims, a belief in the
“finality of prophethood”). See YVONNE Y. HADDAD & JANE I. SMITH, MISSION TO
AMERICA: FIVE ISLAMIC SECTARIAN COMMUNITIES IN NORTH AMERICA 52 (1993).
Ahmadis respond that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was a non law-bearing prophet
subordinate in status to Prophet Muhammad; he came to illuminate Islam in its
pristine beauty and to reform its tainted image, as predicted by Prophet Muhammad. See Siddiq, supra, at 280. For Ahmad and his followers, the Arabic Khatme
Nabuwwat does not refer to the finality of prophethood in a literal sense—that is,
to prophethood’s chronological cessation—but rather to its culmination and exemplification in Prophet Muhammad (i.e., Khatme Nabuwwat signifies the “seal of
prophethood”). See id. According to Ahmadis, the belief that the Prophet Muhammad is the last prophet in chronology does not exalt his spiritual status, as does
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Code (PPC) Sections 295 and 298—the so-called “anti-blasphemy
laws.”46 The collective complaint in the case, Zaheeruddin v. State,
the belief that the Prophet Muhammad is the seal of prophets and the “last word”
on prophets. M.G. Farid, ed. THE HOLY QUR’AN n.2359 (1981) (quoting commentary written by Mirza Bashiruddin Mahmud Ahmad, the Ahmadiyya Community’s
Second Caliph and son of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad). According to his followers, contrary to accusations leveled against him, Ahmad came to crystallize the teachings
of Islam and thereby elevate the status of Prophet Muhammad. Id.
According to Ahmadi sources, the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community currently
has branches in over 195 countries and a worldwide membership exceeding tens of
millions, with large concentrations of Ahmadis in India, Pakistan, Ghana,
Burkina Faso, and The Gambia. See Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, The
Ahmadiyya Movement in Islam: An Overview. There are roughly four million
Ahmadis living in Pakistan. See Siddiq at 283.
46
See PAK. PENAL CODE §§ 298B, 298C [hereinafter ORDINANCE XX].
According to § 298B:
(1) Any person of the Quadiani group or the Lahori group (who
call themselves ‘Ahmadis’ or any other name) who by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation
a. refers to, or addresses, any person, other than a Caliph or companion of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), as
‘Ameer-ul-Mumineen,’ ‘Khalifat-ul-Mumineen,’ ‘Kilafat-ul-Muslimeen’ ‘Sahaabi’ or ‘Razi Allah Anaho’;
b. refers to, or addresses, any person, other than a wife of the
Holy Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon him), as ‘UmmulMumineen’;
c. refers to, or addresses, any person, other than a member of the
family (‘Ahle-bait’) of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be
upon him), as ‘Ahle-bait’; or
d. refers to, or names, or calls, his place of worship as ‘Masjid’;
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to
fine.
(2) Any person of the Quadiani group or Lahori group (who call
themselves as ‘Ahmadis’ or by any other name) who by words,
either spoken or written, or by visible representation, refers to
the mode or form of call to prayers followed by his faith as ‘Azan’
or recites Azan as used by Muslims, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
three years, and shall also be liable to fine.
According to § 298C:
Any person of the Quadiani group or Lahori group (who call
themselves ‘Ahmadis’ or by any other name), who, directly or indirectly, poses himself as a Muslim, or calls or refers to, his faith
as Islam, or preaches or propagates his faith, or invites others to
accept his faith, by words, either spoken or written, or by visible
representations in any manner whatsoever outrages the religious feelings of Muslims, shall be punished with imprisonment of
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was that Pakistan’s anti-blasphemy laws violated the constitutional
rights of religious minorities. The court dismissed the complaint on
two main grounds. First, the court held that Ahmadi religious practice, however peaceful, angered and offended the Sunni majority in Pakistan; to maintain law and order, Pakistan would, therefore, need to
control Ahmadi religious practice. Second, Ahmadis, as non-Muslims,
could not use Islamic epithets in public without violating company and
trademark laws. Pakistan, the court reasoned, had the right to protect
the sanctity of religious terms under these laws and the right to prevent their usage by non-Muslims.
In his majority opinion, Justice Abdul Qadeer Chaudhry relied
almost exclusively on U.S. constitutional and trademark law to arrive
at his decision to uphold the constitutionality of Pakistan’s anti-blasphemy laws. Justice Chaudhry’s legal arguments by analogy demonstrate the court’s striking inattention to the relevant distinctiveness of
U.S. constitutional and trademark law.
B. Trademark Analogy
Pakistan’s anti-blasphemy laws subject those who “indirectly
or directly pose as a Muslim” through “[written or verbal] words” or
“verbal representation” to fine, imprisonment, or capital punishment.
In his majority opinion, Justice Chaudhry identified the legal significance of protecting the sacredness of Islamic terms through Pakistan’s
anti-blasphemy laws. He relied on the company laws of Britain, India,
and Pakistan as well as U.S. trademark law to justify prohibiting
Ahmadis from using Islamic epithets or practices to exercise their
faith. In arriving at this conclusion, he analogizes to U.S. trademark
law thus:
[intentionally] using trade names, trade marks, property
marks or descriptions of others in order to make [third
parties believe] that they belong to the user thereof
amounts to an offence, and not only the perpetrator can
be imprisoned and fined but damages can be recovered
and [an] injunction to restrain him issued. This is true of
either description for a term which may extend to three years
and shall also be liable to fine.
See also PAK. PENAL CODE § 295C (part of the Criminal Law
Amendment Act of 1986, which amended the punishments enumerated in §§ 298B and 298C to include death).
Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation, or by any imputation, innuendo, or insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred name of the Holy Prophet
Muhammad (peace be upon him) shall be punished with death, or
imprisonment for life, and shall be also liable to fine.
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goods of even very small value. For example, the Coca
Cola Company will not permit anyone to sell, even a few
ounces of his own product in his own bottles or other receptacles, marked Coca Cola, even though its price may
be a few cents. . .The principles involved are: do not
deceive and do not violate the property rights of
others. . .The [Ahmadis] who are non-Muslims want to
pass off their faith as Islam? . . .[a] [Muslim] believer. . .will not tolerate a Government which is not prepared to save him of such deceptions or forgeries. . .47
Justice Chaudhry’s analogical argument may be formally represented
as follows:
(1) Pakistan has exclusive right to protect the sacredness of Islamic words, names, and epithets (i.e., it
has exclusive right over its product).
(2) Coca Cola, too, has exclusive right over its product.
(3) Coca Cola will not permit any user to sell its product
or to deceive others into thinking Coca Cola’s product
belongs to the user.
(4) Pakistan should also not permit anyone to use Islamic words, names, and epithets or to deceive others
into thinking such Islamic words, names, and epithets belong to that person.
(5) Ahmadis use Islamic words, names, and epithets
even though they are non-Muslims.
(6) Therefore, Pakistan should prohibit Ahmadis from
using Islamic words, names, and epithets.
For Justice Chaudhry to proceed logically from step (3) to step (4), he
must commit himself to the analogy-warranting rule that if commercially valuable property can be protected under company and trademark law, then religion can be protected under company and
trademark law. Justice Chaudhry makes his analogy-warranting rationale for this rule clear: both commercially valuable property and religion should be free from deceptive use.
Justice Chaudhry’s analogy-warranting rule is fallacious on
several fronts. First, no foreign jurisdiction cited in Zaheeruddin—
British, Canada, or the U.S.—treats restrictions on commercial speech
in the same way as restrictions on religious freedom.48 In fact, in the
U.S. context, federal trademark law makes clear that religious prayers
and names cannot be trademarked.49 Second, Islam, unlike Coca Cola,
47

Zaheeruddin, (1993) 26 SCMR at 1753–54 (Pak.).
Siddiq, supra note 45, at 296 n.99 (citing KAREN PARKER, RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION IN PAKISTAN: THE AHMADI CASE AT THE SUPREME COURT 10 (1993)).
49
Id. at 296–97.
48
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is not a registered company, and religion itself is not commercially valuable property because religious terms are used generically.50 Third,
company and trademark law protect a company’s rights to a unique
product; that Islamic terminology is somehow unique to Islam is an
inaccurate assumption since many Islamic terms have emanated from
other monotheistic religious traditions, such as Christianity and Judaism.51 This last point begs the question whether Pakistan itself has
violated company and trademark law under its own Supreme Court’s
standard.
C. Public Order and Safety Analogies
i. Cantwell v. Connecticut52
The Zaheeruddin court’s main holding was that Pakistan’s
anti-blasphemy laws can constitutionally restrict Ahmadi religious
practice in order to maintain public order and safety and to safeguard
the religious sentiments of Pakistan’s majority Sunni population. In
arriving at this holding, Justice Chaudhry again invoked U.S. federal
law. The Court cited Cantwell v. Connecticut to argue that the freedom to profess one’s religion may be legally restricted. Justice Chaudhry analogizes thus:
The fundamental right. . .is the ‘freedom to profess religion’ but it has been made ‘subject to law, public order and
morality.’ The court [in Cantwell] [has] held that this
right embraces two concepts: freedom to believe and freedom to act. . .The latter cannot be absolute. . .and remains subject to regulation for the protection of
50

See K.M. Sharma, What’s in a Name? Law, Religion, and Islamic Names, 26
DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 151, 188 (1997-1998) (“Religion as an abstract sentiment
or idea is manifestly unpatentable. References to trademarks and company law
are, thus, totally inappropriate in that religion is not a commercial property, nor is
Islam a registered corporate entity.”).
51
Siddiq, supra note 45, at 299.
52
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1939). In Cantwell, defendant Jehovah’s
Witnesses were arrested and later convicted after they distributed religious
materials in a New Haven neighborhood. Defendants claimed their activities,
which included the distribution of books and pamphlets, did not fall within
Connecticut General Statute § 6294, which prohibits “[any] person from soliciting
money, services, subscriptions or any valuable thing for any alleged religion,
charitable, or philanthropic cause from [someone] other than a member of the
organization for whose benefit such person is soliciting. . .[without approval by]
the secretary of the public welfare council. . .” The Court held that § 6294 deprived
defendants of their liberty without due process of law in contravention of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 303. In so holding, the Court in dicta
commented that religious conduct might be subject to regulation for the protection
of society so long as the regulation does not violate protected freedoms. Id. at 304.
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society. . .The phrase ‘subject to law’. . .does neither invest the legislature with unlimited power to unduly restrict [nor] take away the Fundamental Rights
guaranteed in the Constitution, nor can they be completely ignored or by-passed as non-existent. A balance
has thus to be struck between the two, by resorting to a
reasonable interpretation, keeping in view the peculiar
circumstances of each case.53
Justice Chaudhry’s analogical argument may be formally represented
as follows:
(1) Pakistan has a free exercise clause in its
Constitution.
(2) The U.S., too, has a free exercise in its Constitution.
(3) The U.S. Supreme Court in Cantwell indicated that
the U.S. legislature could restrict the freedom to act
insofar as it is for the purpose of protecting society
and does not take away one’s fundamental rights.
(4) The Pakistani legislature could also restrict the freedom to act insofar as it is for the purpose of protecting society and does not take away one’s
fundamental rights.
(5) Pakistan’s anti-blasphemy laws are designed for the
protection of society and do not take away one’s fundamental rights.
(6) Pakistan’s anti-blasphemy laws, therefore, could restrict Ahmadi religious practice to protect Pakistani
society.
For Justice Chaudhry to proceed logically from step (3) to step (4), he
must commit himself to the analogy-warranting rule that if a legislature can restrict religious practice in the name of public order and
safety through a neutral licensing statute,54 then it can also regulate
religious practice in the name of public order and safety through nonneutral anti-blasphemy laws. The analogy-warranting rationale here
appears to be that legislatures should be allowed to determine for
themselves when it is reasonable to restrict religious practice to protect society.
Justice Chaudhry’s analogy-warranting rule is problematic insofar as it ignores the broad protection for religious freedom given in
Cantwell. In considering the constitutional challenge to the Connecticut licensing statute before it, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a
state statute that prohibits the solicitation of funds for religious, chari53

Zaheeruddin, (1993) 26 SCMR at 1758 (Pak.).
This was not the case in Cantwell. The Court struck down the Connecticut
statute as unconstitutional because it was not neutral.
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table and philanthropic purposes without a license is unconstitutional.55 A state may impose a time, place, and manner restriction on
religious practice, but only through a general (non-neutral) and nondiscriminatory piece of legislation.56 Insofar as the grant of a license
to solicit money for a religious cause was left to the discretion of a
Connecticut state official, the Connecticut licensing statute was discriminatory, “burdened the exercise of [religious] liberty,” and thus unconstitutional.57 The court in Cantwell clearly did not intend to allow
legislatures to restrict religious freedom through non-neutral ordinances. The Supreme Court of Pakistan nevertheless analogized to
Cantwell to legitimize its decision to uphold the constitutionality of
Pakistan’s anti-blasphemy laws. The Cantwell analogy provides a telling illustration of how legal argument by analogy can be misused and
abused in the transjudicial context.
ii.

Reynolds v. United States58

Justice Chaudhry analogizes to Reynolds v. United States to
further bolster his contention that non-neutral ordinances may restrict
religious liberty. He writes thus:
The Supreme Court of America in the case of Reynolds
Vs. United States [sic] held that ‘Congress was deprived
of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left
free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order. . .Laws are made for the
government of actions, and while they cannot interfere
with mere religious beliefs and opinions, they may with
practices.’ After taking the above view, the Supreme
Court felt justified to ban polygamy, as it was being practiced by Mormons sect on the ground that it was a duty
imposed on them by their religion and was not a religious belief or opinion. It must be noted that the observations in the last part of the above [quote] are peculiar to
America where the people and not Allah are the
sovereign.59
55

See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 306-07.
Id. at 304.
57
Id. at 307.
58
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). In Reynolds, a member of the
Mormon Church, according to the dictates of his faith, practiced bigamy and was
charged and arrested pursuant to U.S. Revised Statutes Section 5352, which
outlawed bigamy. The Court affirmed the conviction arguing that a federal
statute may interfere with religious practice so as not “to permit every citizen to
become a law unto himself.” Id. at 167.
59
Zaheeruddin, (1993) 26 SCMR at 1758 (Pak.).
56
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Justice Chaudhry’s analogical argument may be formally represented
as follows:
(1) Pakistan accords its legislature the power to reach
actions subversive of good order.
(2) The U.S., too, accords its legislature the power to
reach actions subversive of good order.
(3) The U.S. Supreme Court in Reynolds indicated that
state statutes can interfere with religious practices.
(4) Pakistan’s anti-blasphemy laws can also interfere
with religious practices.
(5) Pakistan’s anti-blasphemy laws, therefore, can interfere with Ahmadi practices.
For Justice Chaudhry to proceed logically from step (3) to step (4), he
must commit himself to the analogy-warranting rule that if a court can
uphold the constitutionality of statutes of general applicability that restrict polygamous acts already deemed to be criminal and odious
under domestic law, then the court can also uphold the constitutionality of non-neutral ordinances that restrict religious practices not
deemed to be criminal or odious under domestic law, but that are
nonetheless criminal or odious in the eyes of a majority population.
The analogy-warranting rationale is embedded in the final line of the
extended quote above—namely that a sovereign nation should be allowed to restrict the activities of a religious group that offend the sentiments of a nation’s majority people.
Once again, Justice Chaudhry’s analogy-warranting rule fails
to withstand rational scrutiny. The statutes banning polygamy predated the religious practices at issue in Reynolds.60 They were of general application and did not target any particular group.61 The practice of polygamy had already been criminalized in the United States.62
The Reynolds court held that certain religious groups were not exempt
from generally applicable laws that restricted practices that had already been criminalized in the United States. The situation at issue in
Zaheeruddin was entirely different. Pakistan’s anti-blasphemy laws
explicitly criminalized the activities of Ahmadis in Pakistan. These
practices, which include calling an Ahmadi place of worship a ‘masjid’
or mosque, reciting the ‘Adhan’ or call for prayer and reciting the
Arabic greeting ‘Assalamo Alaikum’ (“peace be upon you”), were never
previously made to be illegal.63 Indeed, practicing the basic tenets of
60

Siddiq, supra note 45, at 303.
Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 146, 164.
62
Id.
63
See Amjad Mahmood Khan, Persecution of the Ahmadiyya Community in Pakistan: An Analysis Under International Law and International Relations, 16 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 217, 220-29 (2003).
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Islam in Pakistan can hardly be said to be subversive of public order or
to be odious. What the Supreme Court of Pakistan found to be subversive in Zaheeruddin was the transformation of basic Islamic practice
into blasphemy. But blasphemy had never previously been made to be
illegal in Pakistan prior to the passage of the very laws at issue in the
case.64 Thus, Pakistan’s anti-blasphemy laws are not generally applicable laws.65 As such, Reynolds is simply inapposite authority.
iii. Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California66
Having established that Pakistan’s anti-blasphemy laws may
legally restrict Ahmadi religious practice, Justice Chaudhry proceeds
to offer a more expansive argument for restricting religious freedom in
the name of public safety by citing to Hamilton v. Regents. He quotes
Hamilton and analogizes thus:
In Hamilton Vs. Board of Regents of University of California [sic], where students appealed to the Supreme
Court that the act of the university to make a regulation
for compulsory military training was contrary to their religious belief, the court rejected that contention, holding
that the ‘Government owes a duty to the people within
its jurisdiction to preserve itself in adequate strength to
maintain peace and order and assure the enforcement of
law. And every citizen owes the reciprocal duty, according to his capacity, to support and defend the Government against all enemies.’ [This] go[es] to show that
freedom of religion would not be allowed to interfere with
the law and order or public peace and tranquility. . .No
one can be allowed to insult, damage or defile the religion of any other class or outrage their feel64

Id.
For the Supreme Court of Pakistan itself to make this determination is problematic, especially considering that in a case that expressly overruled Reynolds,
Patrick v. Le Fevre, the Second Circuit acknowledged the “judiciary’s incapacity to
judge the religious nature of an adherent’s belief.” Patrick v. Le Fevre, 745 F.2d
153, 157 (2d Cir. 1984).
66
Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934). In Hamilton,
defendant university regents made a course in military science compulsory for all
University of California school students. The university regents suspended a few
Christian students who refused to take the prescribed course because of their
religious and conscientious objections to war. The Court held that the regents’
order requiring compulsory military training did not violate the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. To maintain peace and order, the
government could compel citizens against their will to take their place in the
ranks of the army of their country and risk the chance of being shot down in its
defense. See id. at 262-63.
65
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ings. . .Whenever or wherever the state has reasons to
believe that the peace and order will be disturbed or the
religious feelings of others may be injured, so as to create
law and order situation, it may take such minimum preventive measures as will ensure law and order.67
Justice Chaudhry’s analogical argument might be formally represented as follows:
(1) The Pakistani government owes a duty to protect its
people and maintain law and order, and Pakistani
citizens in turn owe a reciprocal duty to defend the
government against enemies.
(2) The U.S government, too, owes a duty to protect its
people and maintain law and order, and U.S. citizens
in turn owe a reciprocal duty to defend the government against enemies.
(3) The U.S. Supreme Court in Hamilton indicated that
religious freedom can yield to a compelling government need.
(4) In Pakistan, too, religious freedom can yield to a compelling government need.
(5) The Pakistani government had a compelling need to
ensure that the religious feelings of others are not
injured.
(6) The religious liberty of Ahmadis, therefore, can yield
to the Pakistani government’s compelling need to ensure that the feelings of others are not injured.
For Justice Chaudhry to proceed logically from step (3) to step (4), he
must commit himself to the analogy-warranting rule that if a sovereign nation can maintain peace and order by curtailing the religious
freedom of students through compulsory military training, then it can
also do the same by curtailing the religious freedom of religious minorities through anti-blasphemy laws. Again, Justice Chaudhry makes
his analogy-warranting rationale explicit in the Zaheeruddin opinion
itself: “no one can be allowed to insult, damage or defile the religion of
any other class or outrage their feelings.”
Justice Chaudhry’s analogy-warranting rule is deeply flawed.
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the compulsory military training requirement by the University of California school system because the
requirement applied to all students of a particular age attending the
University who had not yet completed certain levels of education. The
requirement was a neutral university regulation and not a non-neutral
state or federal statute. In refusing to take a compulsory military sci67
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ence class at the University of California, the students could not assert
a liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment because the purpose of the university regulation was to effectuate the state’s authority
to train its citizens to serve in the United States army.68 The regulation was never intended to restrict the free exercise of religion.69 Justice Chaudhry misconstrues Hamilton as restricting religious liberty
in the name of military security. More strikingly, he draws parallels
between a neutral university regulation and non-neutral federal antiblasphemy laws. He curiously equates Pakistan’s concerns about not
injuring the feelings of its majority Sunni population with the U.S.’s
concerns about having adequately trained military soldiers to defend
the country.
iv.

Cox v. New Hampshire70

To complete his argument for upholding the constitutionality of
Pakistan’s anti-blasphemy laws in the name of public safety and order,
Justice Chaudhry analogizes to Cox v. New Hampshire thus:
Justice Hughes in Willis Cox v. New Hampshire also enlightened the same subject [of restricting the free exercise of religion in the name if public order] to say: ‘A
statute requiring persons using the public streets for a
parade or procession to procure a special license therefore from the local authorities does not constitute an unconstitutional interference with religious worship or the
practice of religion, as applied to a group marching along
a sidewalk in single file carrying signs and placards advertising their religious beliefs.’71
68

Hamilton, 293 U.S. at 260.
See id. at 266 (Cardozo, J., concurring) (“Instruction in military science, unaccompanied here by any pledge of military service, is not an interference by the
state with the free exercise of religion. . .”).
70
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941). Justice Chaudhry also briefly
analogizes to Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942), to underscore the same
propositions he gleans from Cox. In Cox, defendant Jehovah’s Witnesses were
arrested for marching near city hall carrying religious literature and signs with
religious messages without having obtained a license to do so. They claimed that
New Hampshire Public Law Chapter 145 § 2, which prohibited a “parade or
procession” upon a public street without a special license, was invalid under the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court affirmed the lower court judgment, holding
that the regulation of the streets for parades and processions was a traditional
exercise of control by the state. The Court also found that the New Hampshire
statute was not aimed at any religious or free speech restraint. Cox, 312 U.S. at
573-74.
71
Zaheeruddin, (1993) SCMR at 1764 (Pak.).
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Remarkably, the passage cited does not appear anywhere in the Cox
opinion. Nevertheless, taking the fictitious quote as truth for a moment, Justice Chaudhry’s analogical argument may be formally represented as follows:
(1) Pakistan allows for the free exercise of religion.
(2) The U.S., too, allows for the free exercise of religion.
(3) The U.S. Supreme Court in Cox [allegedly] upheld
statutory restrictions upon religious activities conducted in public streets, in a parade or procession,
without a special license.
(4) Pakistan, too, can promulgate statutory restrictions
upon the religious activities of those publicly manifesting their faith without a special license.
(5) Pakistan’s anti-blasphemy laws restrict the religious
activities of Ahmadis in the name of public order.
(6) Pakistan’s anti-blasphemy laws, therefore, do not unconstitutionally interfere with Ahmadi religious
practice.
Justice Chaudhry’s analogy here is particularly problematic since he
does not concede that Ahmadis may practice their faith publicly if they
secure a special license (the missing logical inference from step (4) to
step (5)). Notwithstanding this omission, for Justice Chaudhry to proceed logically from step (3) to step (4), he must commit himself to the
analogy-warranting rule that if a court can uphold the constitutionality of a neutral statute that impliedly restricts the free exercise of religion only for a specific time, place, and manner, then a court can also
uphold non-neutral anti-blasphemy ordinances that expressly restrict
the free exercise of religion for however long the religious practice in
question disrupts public order. The analogy-warranting rationale is
that a legislature should have statutory authority to regulate public
disturbances owing to religion.
Justice Chaudhry’s analogy-warranting rule to Cox is questionable. The Cox court never legitimates interference with religious worship or practice as the Zaheeruddin court suggests. The New
Hampshire statute sets forth a time, place, and manner regulation and
not a prohibition of religious practice.72 Judge Hughes states clearly
that the regulation of street parades must be applied “without unfair
discrimination,” and that appellants taking part in the parade at issue
were “not prosecuted. . .for maintaining or expressing religious beliefs.”73 Far from restricting religious practice, the statutory requirement of obtaining a special license for a parade or procession was “to
prevent confusion by overlapping parades or processions, to secure
72
73

Cox, 316 U.S. at 576.
Id.
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convenient use of the streets by other travelers, and to minimize the
risk of disorder.”74 Pakistan’s anti-blasphemy laws are not intended to
restrict public practice of religion when such practice interferes with
public order and safety. Rather, they are intended to criminalize the
entire range of activities of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community (and
other minority religious groups) in Pakistan.
D. The Implications of Legal Argument by Analogy in Zaheeruddin
i. Persuasive Authority as Controlling Authority
One possible response to my critique of Justice Chaudhry’s legal arguments by analogy in Zaheeruddin may be that the Supreme
Court of Pakistan relied on U.S. judicial precedent only as persuasive
authority, not controlling authority, to uphold the constitutionality of
Pakistan’s anti-blasphemy laws. Because domestic parties cannot invoke foreign cases as controlling authority, the practical effect of poor
analogical reasoning in Pakistan may not be as pronounced or
significant.
This response may be well taken had the Supreme Court of Pakistan cited at least some domestic authority as controlling in
Zaheeruddin to support its central holdings. But, incredibly, Justice
Chaudhry did not invoke a single Pakistani case to hold that Pakistan
could restrict Ahmadi religious practice in order to maintain public order and safety and that Pakistan had the right to protect the sanctity
of religious terms under company and trademark law. Instead, he relied exclusively on foreign judicial precedent, particularly U.S. constitutional and trademark law. Justice Chaudhry, therefore, effectively
used foreign judicial precedent as controlling authority in Pakistan.
When a court gives controlling significance to target cases of a foreign
jurisdiction, the success or failure of legal argument by analogy becomes that much more critical. Domestic parties may find it difficult
to distinguish foreign case law in subsequent litigation; indeed, they
must trust judges to rationally articulate the methodology and reasoning behind adopting foreign legal pronouncements.
ii. Analogizing to U.S. Law in a Shari’a-Based Common Law
Regime
Pakistan is one of a handful of Muslim countries to use a common law system. But the features of Pakistan’s common law system
are as peculiar as the analogical mode of reasoning Pakistani judges
often utilize. English is one of Pakistan’s official languages (the other,
Urdu). Pakistan’s Constitution is written in English and all court documentation and litigation are recorded and conducted in English.
74

Id. at 575-76.
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Many of Pakistan’s guiding constitutional principles, however, emanate from Islamic law (shari’a), based largely in part on the ulema’s
(class of Muslim clerics) Quranic textual interpretations in Arabic and
Urdu.75 Pakistan’s judicial system has several court systems with
overlapping and sometimes competing jurisdictions. Pakistan has separate civil and criminal systems with special courts for banking, antinarcotics, and antiterrorist cases, as well as the Federal Shariat
Court for certain Hudood offenses (i.e., Islamic laws for serious
crimes).76 The appeals process in the civil system progresses from
Civil Court, District Court, High Court, and the Supreme Court. In the
criminal system, the progression is Magistrate, Sessions court, High
Court, and the Supreme Court. Decisions by the Federal Shariat
Court may be appealed directly to the Supreme Court, which has a
separate Shariat Appellate Branch consisting of three Muslim judges
and two members of the ulema.77
Because Pakistan’s Constitution incorporates elements of Islamic law,78 common law decisions emanating from Pakistan’s civil
and criminal systems, apart from the Federal Shariat Court, often also
invoke shari’a. In Zaheeruddin, for example, Justice Chaudhry compared in detail Ahmadi ideology vis-à-vis traditional Sunni Muslim
ideology to illustrate how Ahmadi practice is inimical to Islam. To
help legitimize his decision, Justice Chaudhry made several references
to Pakistan’s shari’a and even formally adopted a decision rendered by
the Federal Shariat Court.79 Thus, the Zaheeruddin opinion, like
many federal constitutional decisions in Pakistan, is an admixture of
common law and shari’a principles.80 Given this context, Justice
75

See Siddiq, supra note 45, at 295.
Bernard J. Hibbitts, Pakistan: Courts and Judgment, JURIST LEGAL INTELLIGENCE (2003).
77
PAKISTAN CONST., art. VII, § 3A, cl. 203(F).
78
For example, the repugnancy clause states: “No law shall be repugnant to the
teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Qur’an and Sunnah [actions
of the Holy Prophet], and all existing laws shall be brought into conformity therewith.” See PAKISTAN CONST., art. IX, § 227(1). In addition, the Objectives Resolution of 1949, made part of Pakistan’s Constitution in 1985, states: “Muslims shall
be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Qur’an
and Sunnah.” See PAKISTAN CONST., art. I, § 2(a), amended by Presidential Order
No. 14 (1985).
79
Zaheeruddin, (1993) SCMR at 1752 (Pak.).
80
Interpreting a constitution in a manner consistent with principles of faith is
characteristic of even the American legal system. Sanford Levison has described
two dominant faith-based positions regarding constitutional interpretation in the
U.S.: Protestant and Catholic. The Protestant position treats the text of the U.S.
Constitution alone as the source of all constitutional doctrines and the individual
citizen as the text’s ultimate interpreter. The Catholic position treats the U.S.
76
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Chaudhry’s deference to U.S. federal constitutional law proves deceptive insofar as many of the salient features of the U.S. constitution,
such as the Establishment and Due Process Clauses, are simply alien
to shari’a as understood and applied in Pakistan.81
E. The Deleterious Effects of Zaheeruddin
As my various critiques illustrate, Justice Chaudhry ignored
the relevant dissimilarities between U.S. and Pakistani constitutionalism, made poor analogical choices, and drew illogical inferences by
analogy. From a purely legal perspective, the decision is intellectually
dishonest and dubious. Unfortunately, however, the consequences of
Zaheeruddin cut much deeper on a human level.
Pakistani governmental and law enforcement officials have
used Zaheeruddin to justify nearly two decades of institutionalized,
state-supported persecution of religious minorities. In particular, Pakistan’s anti-blasphemy laws criminalize the existence of the
Ahmadiyya Muslim Community. By upholding the laws’ constitutionality, Zaheeruddin legitimized and further entrenched Pakistan’s antiblasphemy regime. While the decision purported to combat threats to
public safety, the opposite effect has been true. Ahmadis have fallen
victim to patent discrimination and sectarian violence.82 In 1994,
within only a year after Zaheeruddin was decided, seventeen blasphemy cases, resulting in one conviction, were registered against
Ahmadis.83 Since 1994, blasphemy cases registered against Ahmadis
now number in the hundreds. In 2010 alone, 45 Ahmadis have been
formally charged in criminal cases (including blasphemy) for professConstitution and unwritten tradition as the source of all constitutional doctrines
and the U.S. Supreme Court as the text’s ultimate interpreter. See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 29 (Princeton Univ. Press 1988). When a judge reasons by analogy using a source case with one faith-based interpretive bias and a
target case with another, she may be necessarily constrained in her selection of
relevant shared characteristics between cases. This inhibition becomes especially
problematic in the transjudicial context when a court like the Supreme Court of
Pakistan analogizes to source cases with both Protestant and Catholic interpretive
biases even as it uses its own shari’a-based interpretive bias. Given this complexity, it is not surprising to note Justice Chaudhry’s misconceived analogical choices
in Zaheeruddin.
81
A.K. BROHI, FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF PAKISTAN 342 (1958).
82
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ing their religion.84 As of December 2010, three Ahmadis languish in
prison having been convicted and sentenced to death for committing
blasphemy.85 The offenses charged in Ahmadi cases have included
wearing an Islamic slogan on a shirt, planning to build an Ahmadi
mosque in Lahore, and distributing Ahmadi literature in a public
square.86
Among the many benefits Slaughter cites in her typology for
transjudicial communication is the potential for greater compliance
with international human rights norms. She writes:
Increasing cross-fertilization of ideas and precedents
among constitutional judges around the world is gradually giving rise to increasingly visible international consensus on various issues. . .To the extent that pockets of
global jurisprudence are emerging, they are most likely
to involve issues of basic human rights. Courts may well
feel a particular common bond with one another in adjudicating human rights cases. . .because such cases engage a core judicial function in many countries of the
world. They ask courts to protect individuals against
abuse of state power. . .87
Zaheeruddin seriously undermines Slaughter’s contention. Not only
did Justice Chaudhry seek to limit the free exercise of religion in Pakistan by upholding the constitutionality of Pakistan’s anti-blasphemy
laws, he disingenuously invoked U.S. constitutional and trademark
law to justify his holding. In fact, he employed transjudicial communi84
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A Pakistani court sentenced him to death on April 27, 1998, a year after he survived an attempt on his life during trial. The case was on appeal to the Lahore
High Court when Masih’s chief defender, Roman Catholic Bishop John Joseph,
committed suicide outside the courtroom to protest Masih’s death sentence. His
act sent shockwaves through the minority Christian community across Pakistan,
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cation to insulate the Supreme Court of Pakistan from possible foreign
criticism of his decision. Zaheeruddin is a glaring example of Pakistan’s failure to abide by the provisions of her own Constitution and
her legal commitments under Article 18 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (“UDHR”), Articles 18, 19, 20 and 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and other
binding peremptory norms related to freedom of religion.88 This notorious decision is a quintessential example of the very “abuse of state
power” Slaughter incorrectly assumes transnational courts would uniformly seek to protect through transjudicial communication.
CONCLUSION
In his majority opinion in Printz v. United States, Justice
Antonin Scalia remarked: “Comparative analysis [is] inappropriate to
the task of interpreting a constitution.”89 One factor that makes comparative analysis inappropriate is the inherent difficulty for judges to
properly employ legal argument by analogy. I have demonstrated that
legal argument by analogy is inconsistently understood and applied,
and when used transjudicially, can lead to destructive outcomes, particularly with contentious and weighty constitutional cases like
Zaheeruddin in Pakistan. Legal argument by analogy in the transjudicial context prompts judges to affirm their own country’s legislative or public mandate more than it prompts them to tether to
international norms. In short, legal argument by analogy is an ill-perceived instrument to further judicial globalization.
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